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
# WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 11 March 1972

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NSA review completed

# SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS



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## Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity throughout South Vietnam was generally at a low level during the week, though there was an increase in attacks by fire in northern Military Region (MR) 1. The present disposition of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in Thua Thien Province has significantly increased the enemy threat against Hue. At least two NVA regimental entities have recently positioned themselves within 20 miles of Hue, and there are preliminary signs that a major command and control authority -- the headquarters of the NVA 324-B Division -- has also moved into the same area.

These moves are classic indicators of imminent tactical activity, and such activity could erupt with little or no warning. Elsewhere in South Vietnam, there has been no significant change in the disposition or activity of enemy forces.

In Laos, the NVA launched a heavy ground assault over the 11-13 March weekend upon friendly positions around Sam Thong, as well as artillery attacks against Long Tieng itself. All irregular positions east and northeast of Sam Thong were lost to the 300-600 man enemy assault force, and four government howitzers had to be destroyed and abandoned. The status of one friendly battalion (400 men) and elements of two others is uncertain at this time; and total irregular casualties cannot be accurately estimated yet. During the weekend, the enemy on several occasions also managed to close the Long Tieng airstrip temporarily, with an assortment of artillery fire including some from 130mm guns. Several of the latter are now reported to be firing from positions only seven to eight miles from Long Tieng. Sporadic artillery fire was still impacting near the Long Tieng runway the morning of 13 March. Elsewhere in Laos, there was no significant change in the military situation.

Enemy activity in Cambodia during the week was at a low level. Operation ANGKOR CHEY -- the government clearing effort near Siem Reap -- continues, but without significant contact. South Vietnamese rangers and armored cavalry elements have initiated a 2,800-man limited cross-border operation opposite MR 3 along Routes 1 and 13. The objective is to sweep and disrupt Communist lines of communications and bases in the area on both sides of the border.

### Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

The acceptance of an additional 1,222 personnel during the week brings the estimate of NVA infiltrators into Cambodia and South Vietnam since 1 October 1971 to some 93,800 - 95,800. The present volume of new groups entering the infiltration pipeline appears to be on the decline, a possible clue that the Communists completed their major personnel inputs for the 1971/72 dry season. In the past, the level of personnel infiltration climbed sharply immediately following each rainy season and was sustained at a high level for some three to four months before tapering off to a significantly lower monthly average. We may now be at the point in this dry season where we will begin to see progressively lower monthly totals.

The 1971/72 enemy

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dry season logistics campaign has not, thus far, been as large as last year's effort, and the current "general offensive" may be designed to overcome that apparent shortfall.

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Communist Developments

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Chinese Premier Chou En-la 25X1 paid an unannounced visit to Hanoi on 4-5 March for the purpose of briefing the North Vietnamese leaders on President Nixon's trip to China.

It is assumed that he personally reassured the North Vietnamese of the constancy of Chinese support. Judging from the continuing (and vitriolic) Hanoi media attacks on the U.S. position in the communique regarding Vietnam and on President Nixon's banquet remarks, it appears that Chou was less than entirely successful in allaying Hanoi's apprehensions.